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| author | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2021-01-02 14:59:09 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-01-12 20:16:17 +0100 |
| commit | 0326960033d8904767aad7444bdf25acc9d31654 (patch) | |
| tree | d127891984c457b301e87a17e7cd7cef9b5db895 | |
| parent | cb13663e387eda6ead1c9e5e80564c584c27f467 (diff) | |
| download | linux-crypto-0326960033d8904767aad7444bdf25acc9d31654.tar.gz linux-crypto-0326960033d8904767aad7444bdf25acc9d31654.zip | |
crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
commit 4204b130b8a4d1cd2c4a0d9a5a09993e8948defe upstream.
Pavel reports that commit 8319c80ab523 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.
So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.
Fixes: 8319c80ab523 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/ecdh.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c index efa4ee72..46570b51 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdh.c +++ b/crypto/ecdh.c @@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, struct ecdh params; unsigned int ndigits; - if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) + if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0 || + params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key)) return -EINVAL; ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id); |