Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
  fixes scattered across the subsystem.

  IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
  and appraised"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
  X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
  akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
  crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
  sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
  MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
  MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
  certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
  X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
  X.509: Support leap seconds
  Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
  X.509: Fix leap year handling again
  PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
  firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
  KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
  KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
  modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
  tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
  ima: require signed IMA policy
  ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
  ima: load policy using path
  ...

1 files changed, 26 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 021d39c0..4a29bac7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
-#include "public_key.h"
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 #include "x509-asn1.h"
 #include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
-#include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h"
 
 struct x509_parse_context {
 	struct x509_certificate	*cert;		/* Certificate being constructed */
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		kfree(cert->akid_id);
 		kfree(cert->akid_skid);
 		kfree(cert->sig.digest);
-		mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
+		kfree(cert->sig.s);
 		kfree(cert);
 	}
 }
@@ -103,12 +102,12 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* Decode the public key */
-	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx,
-			       ctx->key, ctx->key_size);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->pub->key)
 		goto error_decode;
 
+	cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
+
 	/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
 	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
 					 cert->raw_serial_size,
@@ -124,6 +123,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	return cert;
 
 error_decode:
+	kfree(cert->pub->key);
 	kfree(ctx);
 error_no_ctx:
 	x509_free_certificate(cert);
@@ -188,33 +188,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
 
 	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "md4";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha1";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha256";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha384";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha512";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224;
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha224";
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
-	ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+	ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
 
 	/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
 	ctx->key = value + 1;
@@ -404,29 +404,6 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Extract a RSA public key value
- */
-int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
-		    unsigned char tag,
-		    const void *value, size_t vlen)
-{
-	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
-	MPI mpi;
-
-	if (ctx->nr_mpi >= ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->cert->pub->mpi)) {
-		pr_err("Too many public key MPIs in certificate\n");
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
-
-	mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
-	if (!mpi)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	ctx->cert->pub->mpi[ctx->nr_mpi++] = mpi;
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
 #define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
 
@@ -494,7 +471,7 @@ int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
 		     unsigned char tag,
 		     const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
 {
-	static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30,
+	static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,
 						       31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
 	const unsigned char *p = value;
 	unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
@@ -540,17 +517,17 @@ int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
 		if (year % 4 == 0) {
 			mon_len = 29;
 			if (year % 100 == 0) {
-				year /= 100;
-				if (year % 4 != 0)
-					mon_len = 28;
+				mon_len = 28;
+				if (year % 400 == 0)
+					mon_len = 29;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
-	    hour > 23 ||
+	    hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */
 	    min > 59 ||
-	    sec > 59)
+	    sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */
 		goto invalid_time;
 
 	*_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);