diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 1426f03e..44b746e9 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -190,9 +190,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, x509->subject, x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial); x509->seen = true; - ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); - if (ret < 0) - goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; + if (x509->unsupported_key) + goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); sig = x509->sig; @@ -203,22 +202,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n", sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data); - if ((!x509->sig->auth_ids[0] && !x509->sig->auth_ids[1]) || - strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { + if (x509->self_signed) { /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own * authority. */ - pr_debug("- no auth?\n"); - if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size || - memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, - x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0) - return 0; - - ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509); - if (ret < 0) - goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; + if (x509->unsupported_sig) + goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; x509->signer = x509; pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); return 0; @@ -270,7 +261,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, sinfo->index); return 0; } - ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509); + ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, p->sig); if (ret < 0) return ret; x509->signer = p; @@ -282,16 +273,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, might_sleep(); } -maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509: +unsupported_crypto_in_x509: /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set - * sinfo->missing_crypto as the signed info block may still be + * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a * trusted copy of. */ - if (ret == -ENOPKG) - return 0; - return ret; + return 0; } /* @@ -378,9 +367,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, enum key_being_used_for usage) { struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; - struct x509_certificate *x509; int enopkg = -ENOPKG; - int ret, n; + int ret; kenter(""); @@ -422,12 +410,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return -EINVAL; } - for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) { - ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } - for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); if (ret < 0) { |