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Commit 762f8d3c539f ("crypto: testmgr - allow ecdsa-nist-p256 and -p384
in FIPS mode") enabled support for ECDSA in crypto/testmgr.c. The
PKCS#7 signature verification API builds upon the KCAPI primitives to
perform its high-level operations. Therefore, this change in testmgr.c
also allows ECDSA to be used by the PKCS#7 signature verification API
(in FIPS mode).
However, from a FIPS perspective, the PKCS#7 signature verification API
is a distinct "service" from the KCAPI primitives. This is because the
PKCS#7 API performs a "full" signature verification, which consists of
both hashing the data to be verified, and the public key operation.
On the other hand, the KCAPI primitive does not perform this hashing
step - it accepts pre-hashed data from the caller and only performs the
public key operation.
For this reason, the ECDSA self-tests in crypto/testmgr.c are not
sufficient to cover ECDSA signature verification offered by the PKCS#7
API. This is reflected by the self-test already present in this file
for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification.
The solution is simply to add a second self-test here for ECDSA. P-256
with SHA-256 hashing was chosen as those parameters should remain
FIPS-approved for the foreseeable future, while keeping the performance
impact to a minimum. The ECDSA certificate and PKCS#7 signed data was
generated using OpenSSL. The input data is identical to the input data
for the existing RSA self-test.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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In preparation of adding new ECDSA self-tests, the existing data for
the RSA self-tests is moved to a separate file. This file is only
compiled if the new CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST_RSA configuration
option is set, which ensures that the required dependencies (RSA,
SHA-256) are present. Otherwise, the kernel would panic when trying to
execute the self-test.
The introduction of this new option, rather than adding the
dependencies to the existing CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST option,
allows for additional self-tests to be added for different algorithms.
The kernel can then be configured to only execute the self-tests for
those algorithms that are included.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Rather than pass in flags, error pointer, and whether this is a kernel
invocation or not, add a struct proto_accept_arg struct as the argument.
This then holds all of these arguments, and prepares accept for being
able to pass back more information.
No functional changes in this patch.
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Since the signature self-test uses RSA and SHA-256, it must only be
enabled when those algorithms are enabled. Otherwise it fails and
panics the kernel on boot-up.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404221528.51d75177-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 041ec6e33d48 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Make ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE select CRYPTO_SIG to avoid build
errors like the following, which were possible with
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y && CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG=n:
ld: vmlinux.o: in function `public_key_verify_signature':
(.text+0x306280): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_sig'
ld: (.text+0x306300): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_pubkey'
ld: (.text+0x306324): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_verify'
ld: (.text+0x30636c): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_privkey'
Fixes: 63a91af75117 ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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wait_for_completion_killable_timeout()
There is a confusing pattern in the kernel to use a variable named 'timeout' to
store the result of wait_for_completion_killable_timeout() causing patterns like:
timeout = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(...)
if (!timeout) return -ETIMEDOUT;
with all kinds of permutations. Use 'time_left' as a variable to make the code
self explaining.
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The private key in ctx->private_key is currently initialized in reverse
byte order in ecdh_set_secret and whenever the key is needed in proper
byte order the variable priv is introduced and the bytes from
ctx->private_key are copied into priv while being byte-swapped
(ecc_swap_digits). To get rid of the unnecessary byte swapping initialize
ctx->private_key in proper byte order and clean up all functions that were
previously using priv or were called with ctx->private_key:
- ecc_gen_privkey: Directly initialize the passed ctx->private_key with
random bytes filling all the digits of the private key. Get rid of the
priv variable. This function only has ecdh_set_secret as a caller to
create NIST P192/256/384 private keys.
- crypto_ecdh_shared_secret: Called only from ecdh_compute_value with
ctx->private_key. Get rid of the priv variable and work with the passed
private_key directly.
- ecc_make_pub_key: Called only from ecdh_compute_value with
ctx->private_key. Get rid of the priv variable and work with the passed
private_key directly.
Cc: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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ecc_is_key_valid expects a key with the most significant digit in the last
entry of the digit array. Currently ecdh_set_secret passes a reversed key
to ecc_is_key_valid that then passes the rather simple test checking
whether the private key is in range [2, n-3]. For all current ecdh-
supported curves (NIST P192/256/384) the 'n' parameter is a rather large
number, therefore easily passing this test.
Throughout the ecdh and ecc codebase the variable 'priv' is used for a
private_key holding the bytes in proper byte order. Therefore, introduce
priv in ecdh_set_secret and copy the bytes from ctx->private_key into
priv in proper byte order by using ecc_swap_digits. Pass priv to
ecc_is_valid_key.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.
Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement skcipher crypto in BPF crypto framework.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadfed@meta.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422225024.2847039-3-vadfed@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Add a DEFINE_FREE() clause for x509_certificate structs and use it in
x509_cert_parse() and x509_key_preparse(). These are the only functions
where scope-based x509_certificate allocation currently makes sense.
A third user will be introduced with the forthcoming SPDM library
(Security Protocol and Data Model) for PCI device authentication.
Unlike most other DEFINE_FREE() clauses, this one checks for IS_ERR()
instead of NULL before calling x509_free_certificate() at end of scope.
That's because the "constructor" of x509_certificate structs,
x509_cert_parse(), returns a valid pointer or an ERR_PTR(), but never
NULL.
Comparing the Assembler output before/after has shown they are identical,
save for the fact that gcc-12 always generates two return paths when
__cleanup() is used, one for the success case and one for the error case.
In x509_cert_parse(), add a hint for the compiler that kzalloc() never
returns an ERR_PTR(). Otherwise the compiler adds a gratuitous IS_ERR()
check on return. Introduce an assume() macro for this which can be
re-used elsewhere in the kernel to provide hints for the compiler.
Suggested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231003153937.000034ca@Huawei.com/
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934679/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Enable the x509 parser to accept NIST P521 certificates and add the
OID for ansip521r1, which is the identifier for NIST P521.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Adjust the calculation of the maximum signature size for support of
NIST P521. While existing curves may prepend a 0 byte to their coordinates
(to make the number positive), NIST P521 will not do this since only the
first bit in the most significant byte is used.
If the encoding of the x & y coordinates requires at least 128 bytes then
an additional byte is needed for the encoding of the length. Take this into
account when calculating the maximum signature size.
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Register NIST P521 as an akcipher and extend the testmgr with
NIST P521-specific test vectors.
Add a module alias so the module gets automatically loaded by the crypto
subsystem when the curve is needed.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In cases where 'keylen' was referring to the size of the buffer used by
a curve's digits, it does not reflect the purpose of the variable anymore
once NIST P521 is used. What it refers to then is the size of the buffer,
which may be a few bytes larger than the size a coordinate of a key.
Therefore, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Replace the usage of ndigits with nbits where precise space calculations
are needed, such as in ecdsa_max_size where the length of a coordinate is
determined.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add the parameters for the NIST P521 curve and define a new curve ID
for it. Make the curve available in ecc_get_curve.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In ecc_point_mult use the number of bits of the NIST P521 curve + 2. The
change is required specifically for NIST P521 to pass mathematical tests
on the public key.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement vli_mmod_fast_521 following the description for how to calculate
the modulus for NIST P521 in the NIST publication "Recommendations for
Discrete Logarithm-Based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters"
section G.1.4.
NIST p521 requires 9 64bit digits, so increase the ECC_MAX_DIGITS so that
the vli digit array provides enough elements to fit the larger integers
required by this curve.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add the number of bits a curve has to the ecc_curve definition to be able
to derive the number of bytes a curve requires for its coordinates from it.
It also allows one to identify a curve by its particular size. Set the
number of bits on all curve definitions.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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res.x has been calculated by ecc_point_mult_shamir, which uses
'mod curve_prime' on res.x and therefore p > res.x with 'p' being the
curve_prime. Further, it is true that for the NIST curves p > n with 'n'
being the 'curve_order' and therefore the following may be true as well:
p > res.x >= n.
If res.x >= n then res.x mod n can be calculated by iteratively sub-
tracting n from res.x until res.x < n. For NIST P192/256/384 this can be
done in a single subtraction. This can also be done in a single
subtraction for NIST P521.
The mathematical reason why a single subtraction is sufficient is due to
the values of 'p' and 'n' of the NIST curves where the following holds
true:
note: max(res.x) = p - 1
max(res.x) - n < n
p - 1 - n < n
p - 1 < 2n => holds true for the NIST curves
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In preparation for support of NIST P521, adjust the basic tests on the
length of the provided key parameters to only ensure that the length of the
x plus y coordinates parameter array is not an odd number and that each
coordinate fits into an array of 'ndigits' digits. Mathematical tests on
the key's parameters are then done in ecc_is_pubkey_valid_full rejecting
invalid keys.
The change is necessary since NIST P521 keys do not have keys with
coordinates that each require 'full' digits (= all bits in u64 used).
NIST P521 only requires 2 bytes (9 bits) in the most significant digit
unlike NIST P192/256/384 that each require multiple 'full' digits.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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For NIST P192/256/384 the public key's x and y parameters could be copied
directly from a given array since both parameters filled 'ndigits' of
digits (a 'digit' is a u64). For support of NIST P521 the key parameters
need to have leading zeros prepended to the most significant digit since
only 2 bytes of the most significant digit are provided.
Therefore, implement ecc_digits_from_bytes to convert a byte array into an
array of digits and use this function in ecdsa_set_pub_key where an input
byte array needs to be converted into digits.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Replace hard-coded numbers with ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192/256/384_DIGITS where
possible.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The for loop will be executed at least once, so i > 0. If the loop
is interrupted before i is incremented (e.g., when checking len for NULL),
i will not be checked.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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ecc_make_pub_key()
With the current state of the code, ecc_get_curve() cannot return
NULL in crypto_ecdh_shared_secret() and ecc_make_pub_key(). This is
conditioned by the fact that they are only called from ecdh_compute_value(),
which implements the kpp_alg::{generate_public_key,compute_shared_secret}()
methods. Also ecdh implements the kpp_alg::init() method, which is called
before the other methods and sets ecdh_ctx::curve_id to a valid value.
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The PDF is also available via https.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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s/in//
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.
Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will
reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory
bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/)
Remove sentinel from crypto_sysctl_table
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Replace memzero_explicit() and kvfree() with kvfree_sensitive() to fix
the following Coccinelle/coccicheck warning reported by
kfree_sensitive.cocci:
WARNING opportunity for kfree_sensitive/kvfree_sensitive
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Create certificate
openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \
-pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \
-subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der
641069229
# lsmod | head -2
Module Size Used by
ecdsa_generic 16384 0
Fixes: ba1c2bd22584 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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FIPS 186-5 [1] was released approximately 1 year ago. The most
interesting change for ecc_gen_privkey is the removal of curves with
order < 224 bits. This is minimum is now checked in step 1. It is
unlikely that there is still any benefit in generating private keys for
curves with n < 224, as those curves provide less than 112 bits of
security strength and are therefore unsafe for any modern usage.
This patch also updates the documentation for __ecc_is_key_valid and
ecc_gen_privkey to clarify which FIPS 186-5 method is being used to
generate private keys. Previous documentation mentioned that "extra
random bits" was used. However, this did not match the code. Instead,
the code currently uses (and always has used) the "rejection sampling"
("testing candidates" in FIPS 186-4) method.
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with
`gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below:
$ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF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=
EOF
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer
939910969
# lsmod | head -3
Module Size Used by
ecrdsa_generic 16384 0
streebog_generic 28672 0
Repored-by: Paul Wolneykien <manowar@altlinux.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove support for the "Crypto usage statistics" feature
(CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS). This feature does not appear to have ever been
used, and it is harmful because it significantly reduces performance and
is a large maintenance burden.
Covering each of these points in detail:
1. Feature is not being used
Since these generic crypto statistics are only readable using netlink,
it's fairly straightforward to look for programs that use them. I'm
unable to find any evidence that any such programs exist. For example,
Debian Code Search returns no hits except the kernel header and kernel
code itself and translations of the kernel header:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=CRYPTOCFGA_STAT&literal=1&perpkg=1
The patch series that added this feature in 2018
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1537351855-16618-1-git-send-email-clabbe@baylibre.com/)
said "The goal is to have an ifconfig for crypto device." This doesn't
appear to have happened.
It's not clear that there is real demand for crypto statistics. Just
because the kernel provides other types of statistics such as I/O and
networking statistics and some people find those useful does not mean
that crypto statistics are useful too.
Further evidence that programs are not using CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is that
it was able to be disabled in RHEL and Fedora as a bug fix
(https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-9/-/merge_requests/2947).
Even further evidence comes from the fact that there are and have been
bugs in how the stats work, but they were never reported. For example,
before Linux v6.7 hash stats were double-counted in most cases.
There has also never been any documentation for this feature, so it
might be hard to use even if someone wanted to.
2. CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS significantly reduces performance
Enabling CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS significantly reduces the performance of
the crypto API, even if no program ever retrieves the statistics. This
primarily affects systems with a large number of CPUs. For example,
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2039576 reported
that Lustre client encryption performance improved from 21.7GB/s to
48.2GB/s by disabling CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS.
It can be argued that this means that CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS should be
optimized with per-cpu counters similar to many of the networking
counters. But no one has done this in 5+ years. This is consistent
with the fact that the feature appears to be unused, so there seems to
be little interest in improving it as opposed to just disabling it.
It can be argued that because CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is off by default,
performance doesn't matter. But Linux distros tend to error on the side
of enabling options. The option is enabled in Ubuntu and Arch Linux,
and until recently was enabled in RHEL and Fedora (see above). So, even
just having the option available is harmful to users.
3. CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is a large maintenance burden
There are over 1000 lines of code associated with CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS,
spread among 32 files. It significantly complicates much of the
implementation of the crypto API. After the initial submission, many
fixes and refactorings have consumed effort of multiple people to keep
this feature "working". We should be spending this effort elsewhere.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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While looking at UDP receive performance, I saw sk_wake_async()
was no longer inlined.
This matters at least on AMD Zen1-4 platforms (see SRSO)
This might be because rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock()
are no longer nops in recent kernels ?
Add sk_wake_async_rcu() variant, which must be called from
contexts already holding rcu lock.
As SOCK_FASYNC is deprecated in modern days, use unlikely()
to give a hint to the compiler.
sk_wake_async_rcu() is properly inlined from
__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb() and sock_def_readable().
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328144032.1864988-5-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 6add861dcd431e475e24eff95cda1d08d29797ec because it
broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell,
and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs
are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which
algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly
supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something
broke we have to revert the change.
It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated
without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but
for now this just does a full revert to get things working again.
Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz
Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This reverts commit 687f35bd1fc7a325fe6f817af864426e66c288b5.
While removing CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is a worthy goal, this also
removed unrelated infrastructure such as crypto_comp_alg_common.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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while sg_nents is 1, which is always true for the current kernel
as the only user - zswap is this case, we might have a chance to
remove memcpy, thus improve the performance.
Though sg_nents is 1, its buffer might cross two pages. If those
pages are highmem, we have no cheap way to map them to contiguous
virtual address because kmap doesn't support more than one page
(kmap single higmem page could be still expensive for tlb) and
vmap is expensive.
So we also test and enure page is not highmem in order to safely
use page_to_virt before removing the memcpy. The good news is
that in the most majority of cases, we are lowmem, and we are
always lowmem in those modern and popular hardware.
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Tested-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Commit 7a8cb30a6685 ("crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates")
implemented the said templates. Add ffdhe2048(dh) test as it is the
fastest one. This is a requirement for the FIPS certification.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove support for the "Crypto usage statistics" feature
(CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS). This feature does not appear to have ever been
used, and it is harmful because it significantly reduces performance and
is a large maintenance burden.
Covering each of these points in detail:
1. Feature is not being used
Since these generic crypto statistics are only readable using netlink,
it's fairly straightforward to look for programs that use them. I'm
unable to find any evidence that any such programs exist. For example,
Debian Code Search returns no hits except the kernel header and kernel
code itself and translations of the kernel header:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=CRYPTOCFGA_STAT&literal=1&perpkg=1
The patch series that added this feature in 2018
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1537351855-16618-1-git-send-email-clabbe@baylibre.com/)
said "The goal is to have an ifconfig for crypto device." This doesn't
appear to have happened.
It's not clear that there is real demand for crypto statistics. Just
because the kernel provides other types of statistics such as I/O and
networking statistics and some people find those useful does not mean
that crypto statistics are useful too.
Further evidence that programs are not using CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is that
it was able to be disabled in RHEL and Fedora as a bug fix
(https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-9/-/merge_requests/2947).
Even further evidence comes from the fact that there are and have been
bugs in how the stats work, but they were never reported. For example,
before Linux v6.7 hash stats were double-counted in most cases.
There has also never been any documentation for this feature, so it
might be hard to use even if someone wanted to.
2. CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS significantly reduces performance
Enabling CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS significantly reduces the performance of
the crypto API, even if no program ever retrieves the statistics. This
primarily affects systems with large number of CPUs. For example,
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2039576 reported
that Lustre client encryption performance improved from 21.7GB/s to
48.2GB/s by disabling CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS.
It can be argued that this means that CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS should be
optimized with per-cpu counters similar to many of the networking
counters. But no one has done this in 5+ years. This is consistent
with the fact that the feature appears to be unused, so there seems to
be little interest in improving it as opposed to just disabling it.
It can be argued that because CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is off by default,
performance doesn't matter. But Linux distros tend to error on the side
of enabling options. The option is enabled in Ubuntu and Arch Linux,
and until recently was enabled in RHEL and Fedora (see above). So, even
just having the option available is harmful to users.
3. CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is a large maintenance burden
There are over 1000 lines of code associated with CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS,
spread among 32 files. It significantly complicates much of the
implementation of the crypto API. After the initial submission, many
fixes and refactorings have consumed effort of multiple people to keep
this feature "working". We should be spending this effort elsewhere.
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The function dh_is_pubkey_valid was added to for FIPS but it was
only partially conditional to fips_enabled.
In particular, the first test in the function relies on the last
test to work properly, but the last test is only run in FIPS mode.
Fix this inconsistency by making the whole function conditional
on fips_enabled.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Correct various small problems in the help text:
a. change 2 spaces to ", "
b. finish an incomplete sentence
c. change non-working URL to working URL
Fixes: 05d2a9cd8da6 ("crypto: Kconfig - simplify compression/RNG entries")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218458
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: Christoph Biedl <bugzilla.kernel.bpeb@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The lskcipher glue code for skcipher needs to copy the IV every
time rather than only on the first and last request. Otherwise
those algorithms that use IV to perform chaining may break, e.g.,
CBC.
This is because crypto_skcipher_import/export do not include the
IV as part of the saved state.
Reported-by: syzbot+b90b904ef6bdfdafec1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0707e88b0fc9 ("crypto: skcipher - Make use of internal state")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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LLVM moved their issue tracker from their own Bugzilla instance to GitHub
issues. While all of the links are still valid, they may not necessarily
show the most up to date information around the issues, as all updates
will occur on GitHub, not Bugzilla.
Another complication is that the Bugzilla issue number is not always the
same as the GitHub issue number. Thankfully, LLVM maintains this mapping
through two shortlinks:
https://llvm.org/bz<num> -> https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num>
https://llvm.org/pr<num> -> https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/<mapped_num>
Switch all "https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num>" links to the
"https://llvm.org/pr<num>" shortlink so that the links show the most up to
date information. Each migrated issue links back to the Bugzilla entry,
so there should be no loss of fidelity of information here.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240109-update-llvm-links-v1-3-eb09b59db071@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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SP 800-56Br2, Section 7.1.1 [1] specifies that:
1. If m does not satisfy 1 < m < (n – 1), output an indication that m is
out of range, and exit without further processing.
Similarly, Section 7.1.2 of the same standard specifies that:
1. If the ciphertext c does not satisfy 1 < c < (n – 1), output an
indication that the ciphertext is out of range, and exit without further
processing.
This range is slightly more conservative than RFC3447, as it also
excludes RSA fixed points 0, 1, and n - 1.
[1] https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey() is only called from ahash.c itself,
make it a static function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When a zero-length message is hashed by algif_hash, and an error
is triggered, it tries to free an SG list that was never allocated
in the first place. Fix this by not freeing the SG list on the
zero-length error path.
Reported-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Fixes: 483577ac3920 ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reported-by: syzbot+3266db0c26d1fbbe3abb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The cbc template should not be applied on stream ciphers, especially
ones that have internal state. Enforce this by checking the state
size when the instance is created.
Reported-by: syzbot+050eeedd6c285d8c42f2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 67d9a2e93f68 ("crypto: arc4 - Add internal state")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Commit a93492cae30a ("crypto: ccree - remove data unit size support")
removed support for the xts512 and xts4096 algorithms, but left them
defined in testmgr.c. This patch removes those definitions.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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