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This patch commit 5cec70e9bcd56bf924c6b08cad3db16fb54e1c0d as
it is only a workaround for the real bug and the proper fix has
now been applied as af900a7ee6a17784a9a343421ef0e3fe67f264fc
("crypto: user - re-add size check for CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG").
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We accidentally return PTR_ERR(NULL) which is success but we should
return -ENOMEM.
Fixes: 1d55d90cae20 ('crypto: drbg - use CTR AES instead of ECB AES')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Added support for SHA-3 algorithm test's
in tcrypt module and related test vectors.
Signed-off-by: Raveendra Padasalagi <raveendra.padasalagi@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds the implementation of SHA3 algorithm
in software and it's based on original implementation
pushed in patch https://lwn.net/Articles/518415/ with
additional changes to match the padding rules specified
in SHA-3 specification.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Raveendra Padasalagi <raveendra.padasalagi@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As it is if you ask for a sync gcm you may actually end up with
an async one because it does not filter out async implementations
of ghash.
This patch fixes this by adding the necessary filter when looking
for ghash.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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crypto/drbg.c:1637:39-40: Unneeded semicolon
Remove unneeded semicolon.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/semicolon.cocci
CC: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Return the raw key with no other processing so that the caller
can copy it or MPI parse it, etc.
The scope is to have only one ANS.1 parser for all RSA
implementations.
Update the RSA software implementation so that it does
the MPI conversion on top.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The TFM object maintains the key for the CTR DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CTR DRBG update function performs a full CTR AES operation including
the XOR with "plaintext" data. Hence, remove the XOR from the code and
use the CTR mode to do the XOR.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Hardware cipher implementation may require aligned buffers. All buffers
that potentially are processed with a cipher are now aligned.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CTR DRBG derives its random data from the CTR that is encrypted with
AES.
This patch now changes the CTR DRBG implementation such that the
CTR AES mode is employed. This allows the use of steamlined CTR AES
implementation such as ctr-aes-aesni.
Unfortunately there are the following subtile changes we need to apply
when using the CTR AES mode:
- the CTR mode increments the counter after the cipher operation, but
the CTR DRBG requires the increment before the cipher op. Hence, the
crypto_inc is applied to the counter (drbg->V) once it is
recalculated.
- the CTR mode wants to encrypt data, but the CTR DRBG is interested in
the encrypted counter only. The full CTR mode is the XOR of the
encrypted counter with the plaintext data. To access the encrypted
counter, the patch uses a NULL data vector as plaintext to be
"encrypted".
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove unused header cpumask.h from crypto/ablkcipher.c.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CTR DRBG code always set the key for each sym cipher invocation even
though the key has not been changed.
The patch ensures that the setkey is only invoked when a new key is
generated by the DRBG.
With this patch, the CTR DRBG performance increases by more than 150%.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG netlink message type provides a buffer to the
kernel to retrieve information from the kernel. The data buffer will not
provide any input and will not be read. Hence the nlmsg_parse is not
applicable to this netlink message type.
This patch fixes the following kernel log message when using this
netlink interface:
netlink: 208 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `XXX'.
Patch successfully tested with libkcapi from [1] which uses
CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG to obtain cipher-specific information from the kernel.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In some rare randconfig builds, we can end up with
ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE enabled but CRYPTO_AKCIPHER disabled,
which fails to link because of the reference to crypto_alloc_akcipher:
crypto/built-in.o: In function `public_key_verify_signature':
:(.text+0x110e4): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_akcipher'
This adds a Kconfig 'select' statement to ensure the dependency
is always there.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyring instead of the
built-in keyring if available as the source of trustworthy keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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As akcipher uses an SG interface, you must not use vmalloc memory
as input for it. This patch fixes testmgr to copy the vmalloc
test vectors to kmalloc memory before running the test.
This patch also removes a superfluous sg_virt call in do_test_rsa.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Running self-tests for a short-lived KVM VM takes 28ms on my laptop.
This commit adds a flag 'cryptomgr.notests' which allows them to be
disabled.
However if fips=1 as well, we ignore this flag as FIPS mode mandates
that the self-tests are run.
Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The pkcs1pad template needs CRYPTO_MANAGER so it needs
to be explicitly selected by CRYPTO_RSA.
Reported-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The crypto hash walk code is broken when supplied with an offset
greater than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. This patch fixes it by adjusting
walk->pg and walk->offset when this happens.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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__GFP_REPEAT has a rather weak semantic but since it has been introduced
around 2.6.12 it has been ignored for low order allocations.
lzo_init uses __GFP_REPEAT to allocate LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS 16K. This is
order 3 allocation request and __GFP_REPEAT is ignored for this size
as well as all <= PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY requests.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The output buffer length has to be at least as big as the key_size.
It is then updated to the actual output size by the implementation.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.
This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.
Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be
generalised.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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We should call verify_signature() rather than directly calling
public_key_verify_signature() if we have a struct key to use as we
shouldn't be poking around in the private data of the key struct as that's
subtype dependent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any
dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the
public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be
generalised.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.
verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed
or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the
cert is self-signed, which may not be true.
Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name
and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the
same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end
of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it
has to be called anyway.
Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed
certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse().
We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information:
(1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the
signature due to missing crypto).
(2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be
used. We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make
use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't
verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the
chain of trust.
(3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto
to be checked. We can still use the key held in this certificate,
even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the
system trusted keyring, for instance. We just can't add it to a ring
of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust.
Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and
replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Point to the public_key_signature struct from the pkcs7_signed_info struct
rather than embedding it. This makes the code consistent with the X.509
signature handling and makes it possible to have a common cleanup function.
We also save a copy of the digest in the signature without sharing the
memory with the crypto layer metadata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature)
including the digest and the key identifiers.
Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in
x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can
be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the
signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.
For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Clean up some whitespace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The HMAC implementation allows setting the HMAC key independently from
the hashing operation. Therefore, the key only needs to be set when a
new key is generated.
This patch increases the speed of the HMAC DRBG by at least 35% depending
on the use case.
The patch is fully CAVS tested.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The OID_sha224 case is missing a break and it falls through
to the -ENOPKG error default. Since HASH_ALGO_SHA224 seems
to be supported, this looks like an unintentional missing break.
Fixes: c439ff12d5f8 ("PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Following the async change for algif_skcipher
this patch adds similar async read to algif_aead.
changes in v3:
- add call to aead_reset_ctx directly from aead_put_sgl instead of calling
them separatelly one after the other
- remove wait from aead_sock_destruct function as it is not needed
when sock_hold is used
changes in v2:
- change internal data structures from fixed size arrays, limited to
RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES, to linked list model with no artificial limitation.
- use sock_kmalloc instead of kmalloc for memory allocation
- use sock_hold instead of separate atomic ctr to wait for outstanding
request
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the
*_trusted argument is never set to false.
pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering
a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for
example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust.
Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local
variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust():
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14
load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158
[<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf
[<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370
[<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370
[<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50
[<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0
[<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170
[<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b
[<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290
[...]
The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust
when it really shouldn't have.
Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning
of pkcs7_validate_trust().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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CMA allocation should be guaranteed to succeed by definition, but,
unfortunately, it would be failed sometimes. It is hard to track down
the problem, because it is related to page reference manipulation and we
don't have any facility to analyze it.
This patch adds tracepoints to track down page reference manipulation.
With it, we can find exact reason of failure and can fix the problem.
Following is an example of tracepoint output. (note: this example is
stale version that printing flags as the number. Recent version will
print it as human readable string.)
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678375: page_ref_set: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x0 count=1 mapcount=0 mapping=(nil) mt=4 val=1
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678378: kernel_stack:
=> get_page_from_freelist (ffffffff81176659)
=> __alloc_pages_nodemask (ffffffff81176d22)
=> alloc_pages_vma (ffffffff811bf675)
=> handle_mm_fault (ffffffff8119e693)
=> __do_page_fault (ffffffff810631ea)
=> trace_do_page_fault (ffffffff81063543)
=> do_async_page_fault (ffffffff8105c40a)
=> async_page_fault (ffffffff817581d8)
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678379: page_ref_mod: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40048 count=2 mapcount=1 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=1
[snip]
...
...
<...>-9131 [001] 93.174468: test_pages_isolated: start_pfn=0x17800 end_pfn=0x17c00 fin_pfn=0x17ac9 ret=fail
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 93.174843: page_ref_mod_and_test: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40068 count=0 mapcount=0 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=-1 ret=1
=> release_pages (ffffffff8117c9e4)
=> free_pages_and_swap_cache (ffffffff811b0697)
=> tlb_flush_mmu_free (ffffffff81199616)
=> tlb_finish_mmu (ffffffff8119a62c)
=> exit_mmap (ffffffff811a53f7)
=> mmput (ffffffff81073f47)
=> do_exit (ffffffff810794e9)
=> do_group_exit (ffffffff81079def)
=> SyS_exit_group (ffffffff81079e74)
=> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (ffffffff817560b6)
This output shows that problem comes from exit path. In exit path, to
improve performance, pages are not freed immediately. They are gathered
and processed by batch. During this process, migration cannot be
possible and CMA allocation is failed. This problem is hard to find
without this page reference tracepoint facility.
Enabling this feature bloat kernel text 30 KB in my configuration.
text data bss dec hex filename
12127327 2243616 1507328 15878271 f2487f vmlinux_disabled
12157208 2258880 1507328 15923416 f2f8d8 vmlinux_enabled
Note that, due to header file dependency problem between mm.h and
tracepoint.h, this feature has to open code the static key functions for
tracepoints. Proposed by Steven Rostedt in following link.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/9/699
[arnd@arndb.de: crypto/async_pq: use __free_page() instead of put_page()]
[iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com: fix build failure for xtensa]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak Kconfig text, per Vlastimil]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.
To make this work, the following changes have been made:
(1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the
padding and returns just the message hash.
(2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this,
and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.
(3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
and and has been merged into public_key.c.
(4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.
Thoughts:
(*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates
registered that share most of the code?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This adds hash param to pkcs1pad.
The pkcs1pad template can work with or without the hash.
When hash param is provided then the verify operation will
also verify the output against the known digest.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime object carries an ISO 8601 format date and time.
The time is permitted to show midnight as 00:00 or 24:00 (the latter being
equivalent of 00:00 of the following day).
The permitted value is checked in x509_decode_time() but the actual
handling is left to mktime64().
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected and could
lead to an unbootable kernel.
Note that with this patch we also permit any 24:mm:ss time and extend this
to UTCTime, which whilst not strictly correct don't permit much leeway in
fiddling date strings.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
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The format of ASN.1 GeneralizedTime seems to be specified by ISO 8601
[X.680 46.3] and this apparently supports leap seconds (ie. the seconds
field is 60). It's not entirely clear that ASN.1 expects it, but we can
relax the seconds check slightly for GeneralizedTime.
This results in us passing a time with sec as 60 to mktime64(), which
handles it as being a duplicate of the 0th second of the next minute.
We can't really do otherwise without giving the kernel much greater
knowledge of where all the leap seconds are. Unfortunately, this would
require change the mapping of the kernel's current-time-in-seconds.
UTCTime, however, only supports a seconds value in the range 00-59, but for
the sake of simplicity allow this with UTCTime also.
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected,
potentially making a kernel unbootable.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
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There are still a couple of minor issues in the X.509 leap year handling:
(1) To avoid doing a modulus-by-400 in addition to a modulus-by-100 when
determining whether the year is a leap year or not, I divided the year
by 100 after doing the modulus-by-100, thereby letting the compiler do
one instruction for both, and then did a modulus-by-4.
Unfortunately, I then passed the now-modified year value to mktime64()
to construct a time value.
Since this isn't a fast path and since mktime64() does a bunch of
divisions, just condense down to "% 400". It's also easier to read.
(2) The default month length for any February where the year doesn't
divide by four exactly is obtained from the month_length[] array where
the value is 29, not 28.
This is fixed by altering the table.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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The boolean want is not initialized and hence garbage. The default should
be false (later it is only set to true on tne sinfo->authattrs check).
Found with static analysis using CoverityScan
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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RFC 3686 CTR in various authenc methods.
rfc3686(ctr(aes)) is already marked fips compliant,
so these should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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