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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2020-03-18 18:51:43 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2020-03-18 18:51:43 -0700 |
commit | 36d129bf5e934d2c22966cd5ba99e970402cc362 (patch) | |
tree | cbe8424419b8eca14736eb0ab02ce5f9c509915a /drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | |
parent | 105ba8ae51e0178462b4cdf2f82c6e98fac19c04 (diff) | |
parent | c5e5f40e27f6b87324ae89d175879cf35498632c (diff) | |
download | wireguard-linux-trimmed-36d129bf5e934d2c22966cd5ba99e970402cc362.tar.gz wireguard-linux-trimmed-36d129bf5e934d2c22966cd5ba99e970402cc362.zip |
Merge branch 'wireguard-fixes'
Jason A. Donenfeld says:
====================
wireguard fixes for 5.6-rc7
I originally intended to spend this cycle working on fun optimizations
and architecture for WireGuard for 5.7, but I've been a bit neurotic
about having 5.6 ship without any show stopper bugs. WireGuard has been
stable for a long time now, but that doesn't make me any less nervous
about the real deal in 5.6. To that end, I've been doing code reviews
and having discussions, and we also had a security firm audit the code.
That audit didn't turn up any vulnerabilities, but they did make a good
defense-in-depth suggestion. This series contains:
1) Removal of a duplicated header, from YueHaibing.
2) Testing with 64-bit time in our test suite.
3) Account for skb->protocol==0 due to AF_PACKET sockets, suggested
by Florian Fainelli.
4) Clean up some code in an unreachable switch/case branch, suggested
by Florian Fainelli.
5) Better handling of low-order points, discussed with Mathias
Hall-Andersen.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c index 4a15389..da3b782 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wg_device *wg) size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len; struct udphdr *udp; - if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol || + if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) || skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head || (skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) > skb_tail_pointer(skb))) @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, */ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */ - skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb); + skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb); if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len); if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr))) @@ -587,8 +587,7 @@ void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device *wg, struct sk_buff *skb) wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb); break; default: - net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n", - wg->dev->name, skb); + WARN(1, "Non-exhaustive parsing of packet header lead to unknown packet type!\n"); goto err; } return; |